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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's order on intermediate appeal affirming the
magistrate's order denying Two Jinn Inc.'s ("Two Jinn") Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and
Exonerate Bond ("motion to exonerate").

B. General Course of Proceedings
In February 2005, Aaron Harris was charged with misdemeanor Driving Under the
Influence in violation of I.C. 5 18-8004 in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. R. 8. On May 9, 2005, Mr.
Harris pled guilty and was sentenced to two years of probation. R. 37. As relevant to this
appeal, the state accused Mr. Harris of violating his probation in the Spring of 2007 and the
magistrate ordered Mr. Harris to appear and show cause why his probation should not be revoked
on June 6,2007. R. 59-60,67-69,76. Mr. Harris did not appear for court on June 6 and the
court issued a warrant fol- his arrest setting bond at $5000. R. 77-78. After Mr. Harris was
ai~estedon this warrant, Two Jinn posted a bond on behalf of 1,incoln General Insurance
Company to secure Mr. Harris' presence in the probation violation proceedings. R. 4, 110. W.
Harris appeared in couit on July 31 and September 17,2007. R. 79-82. On October 29,2007,
Mr. Han-is appeared in court and admitted violating the terms of his probation. R. 93-94.
On December 17, 2007, Mr. H m i s did not appear in court for the disposition hearing but
the magistrate declined to issue a warrant, indicating there may have been confusion regarding
the court date. See R. 95-100. The court reset the disposition hearing for February 5,2008. R.

5. The day prior to the hearing, Mi. Harris left an urgent message for his attorney requesting a
continuance because he was unable to get the time off work to travel to C ~ e u d'
r Alene from

Oregon. Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 6, In. 10-17; see also R. 104. The magistrate denied the
continuance and forfeited the bond posted by Two Jinn. R. 104-05; Tr. (10-31-2008),' pg. 7,

On February 11,2008, Two Jinn assigned an investigator to locate Mr. Harris and bring
him before the court. R. 122-23. The investigator contacted Mr. Harris by telephone and he
informed the investigator that he had moved to Portland, Oregon but that he would retum to
Idaho to address the warrant. R. 123. The investigator also contacted the co-signer on the bond,
who assured the investigator that Mr. Harris would take care of the warrant or that the co-signor
would pel-sonally retrieve Mr. Ha~risfrom Portland. R. 123. Despite these assurances, Mr.
Harris did not voluntarily appear in Idaho. In July 2008, the investigator obtained an address for
the defendant in The Dalles, Oregon. R. 123. Another investigator traveled to The Dalles,
located Mr. Harris, attempted to convince him to retum to Idaho, and offered him a ride. R. 126,
Mr. Harris refused to return to Idaho with the investigator but indicated he would retum with the
co-signer in a few days. R. 126. The investigator photographed Mr. Harris and his identification
and took his fingeiyrints. R. 126-132. Because the warrant was not extraditable and Oregon law
prohibits bail agents from arresting fugitives, the investigator lacked any legal recourse to retum
Mr. Harris to Idaho involuntarily. R. 126.
Two Jinn filed a motion to exonerate, attaching the affidavits of the investigators,
j~hotographsof Mr. EIasris and his identification and fingerprints. R. 106-132. Two Jinn argued
that, although i t had gone to extensive efforts to locate Mr. Harris and had indeed found him, it
could not return him to the couit due to the type of warrant issued and Oregon law. R. 108-09.

I

This transcript is ah exhibit in this appeal. R. 109

2

Two Jinn asselled that, therefore, justice did not requlre enforcement of the forfeiture. R. 109
Following a hearlng on October 11, 2008, the magistrate denled Two Jinn's motion. R. 143
Two Jinn appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate's decision. R. 145-47,
176. Thls appeal follows. R. 178-79.

111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the district court e n in affirming the magistrate's decision because the magistrate
abused its discretion in denying Two Jin~i'smotion to exonerate?

B. Did the district court e n in affirming the magistrate's decision because the magistrate
erred in concluding the doctrine of impossibility did not require exoneration of the bond?

IV. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review
When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court

directly reviews the district court's decision.
(2009); Losser

11.

I11

re Matey, 147 Idaho 604, 607, 213 P.3d 389, 392

Bmdstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758,760 (2008). Thus, this Court

reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial, competent evidence
to support the magistrate's factual findings and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law
follow from those findings. Depnrtnzent of Henltlz & Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 353, 355, 209
P.3d 650,652 (2009); Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760. If those findings are so
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's
decision, this Court will affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Doe, 147
Idaho at 35556,209 P.3d at 652-53; Losser, 145 Idaho at 672,183 P.3d at 760.

B.

That the Interests of Justice
The Magistrate Abused its Discretion in Concludi~~g
Required Forfeiture of the Bond.

1.

Governing legal standards

If it appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement, the court that
forfeited the bail may direct that it be set aside. I.C.R. 46(e)(4).2 The decision whether to set
aside a folfelture or exonerate bond under Rule 46(e)(4) 1s committed to the trral court's
discretion. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651,655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct. App.
2007); State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 53,910 P.2d 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994). In reviewing a trial
court's exercise of discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within theouter boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1,3,843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); Quiclc Release Bnil Bonds, 144 Idaho at
655, 167 P.3d at 792.
The primary purpose of bail is not punitive but, rather, to ensure the presence of the
accused. Quick Release Bnil Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. It is not the purpose of
bail to collect revenue for the state. 8A Am. Jur. 2d $ 2. Additionally, public policy disfavors
forfeitures. State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, I. 17-18,952 P.2d 1249, 1253-54
(Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. Far West I n . Co., 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 795 (2001) (the law
traditionally disfavors forteitures and statutes imposing them are to be strictly construed); Board
On June 15,2009, the Idaho Supreme Court repealed ICR 46 in its entirety and adopted
a new I.C.R. 46, which became effective July 1,2009. Similarly, on April 1,2009, the
legislature repealed previous bail statutes and enacted the Idaho Bail Act ("the Bail Act"), which
also became effective July 1,2009. See 2009 Idaho Laws Ch. 90 (H.B. 184). Exoneration where
justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement is now governed by I.C.R. 46(h) and I.C. $
19-2917. However, because Two Jinn filed it;motion to exonerate in 2008, the old rule governs
this appeal.

of Corn'rs of Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So.2d 10, 12 (Fla. App. 2003) ("Courts say
that such statutes should be construed liberally to favor sureties, since justice does not favor
forfeiture").
In deciding how much, if any, of the bond to forfeit, the court should consider: (1) the
wilfulness of the defendant's violation of bail conditions; (2) the surety's participation in locating
and apprehending the defendant; (3) the costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the state
as a result of the violation; (4) any intangible costs; (5) the public's interest in ensuring a
defendant's appearance; and (6) any mitigating factors. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at
655, 167 P.3d at 792; Fry, 128 Idaho at 53, 910 P.2d at 167. Other relevant factors mclude
whether the state exhibited any actual interest in regaining custody of the delendant through
prompt efforts to extradite him, whether the bonding company has attempted to assist or persuade
the defendant to expedite his return to Idaho and the need to deter the defendant and others from
future violations. Quiclc Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792

2.

The magistrate and district court decisions

Here, the facts alleged in Two Jinn's motion and supporting affidavit were not disputed.
However, although tile magistrate acknowledged that Oregon law does not permit bail agents to
apprehend fugitives, it denied the motion to exonerate because:
There are ways to secure the attendance in the State of Idaho of somebody
who's charged with a misdemeanor. There's nothing before me that anybody has
ever taken any of those steps. You can invoke the extradition powers of the states
on a misdemeanor, as well. It is very rarely done. But here there's been no effo~ts
by anybody that I have seen to try and invoke that process to see if Mr. Harris can
be brought back through the cooperative efforts of the Governor's Office of the
State of Idaho and the Governor's office of the State of Oregon.
-Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 9, in. 6-15, The magistrate also found that Two Jmn had the obligation to

adequately secure its bond and:
when these bonds were forfeited, if the bonding company hadn't secured
enough collateral, or co-signers, or any other security regarding the obligations,
that's the bond company's responsibjlity. That's their obligation.
And I don't find that because they have placed themselves in that situation,
in this particular case, that it makes it unjust to not forfeiture the bond - or not
forfeit the bond.
Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 10, In. 1-18.
On appeal to the dlstrict court, Two Jmn argued that the magistrate's oplnlon sent the
message that "so long as the non-appearing deiendants cross the nearby Oregon border, they will
be free from the efforts of either their bail agent or the state to secure their return." Tr. (5-272009), pg. 16, in. 20-25. In response to this argument, the district court indicated:
Well, that's not the purpose of bond. The purpose of bond is as set forth in Quick
Release and as noted by [the magistrate], and [Mr. Ha~i-is]didn't show. Harris
didn't show. I'm not aware of any restriction that - or any statutory requirement
that only the State can pursue extradition process, and even if that were true, even
if a statute could be found, really the only effol-ts that Two Jinn brought to bear
was the filing of the motion to exonerate bond and not - I'm not seeing any direct
effort on the City of Coeur d'Alene, or I guess to go up the chain of command,
Kootenai County Prosecutor, State of Idaho AG, so it seems to me that, you know,
some other things could've been done.
Id. at pg. pg. 17, In. 1-13

3.

Why relief should be granted

The magistrate abused its discretion in refusing to exonerate the bond because it applied
the incorsect legal standard, erroneously believed that Two Jinn could request extradition and
misunderstood how the purpose of bail is effectuated through relief from fo~feiture.Its decision
was thus inconsistent with applicable legal standards and not reached through an exercise of
reason. Therefore, the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision
Initially, the magistrate denied Two Jinn's motion because it concluded Two Jinn failed

to demonstratc that "it would . . .not be just to let the forfeiture stand." Tr. (10-31-2008), pg. 9,
In. 4-5; see also pg. 10, In. In. 15-18. However, Rule 46(e)(4) allows the trial court to set aside
the forfeiture and exonerate the bond if "if it appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's
enforcement." Thus, rather than determine whether the forfeiture was unjust, the magistrate
should have determined whether justice required the forfeiture. The distinction between the
standard ut~hzcdby the magistrate and the standard set forth in Rule 46 reflects the publlc policy
against forfeiture. See Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 ldaho at 117-18,952 P.2d at 1253-54
(public policy disfavors forfeitures). In determining whether the forfeiture was unjust instead of
whether justice 1-equiredthe forfeiture's enforcement, the magistrate did not reach its decision
consistently with applicable legal standards.
Additionally, the magistrate - and the district court - incorrectly weighed the state's
failure to seek extradition against Two Jinn, rather than applying that factor in Two Jinn's favor.
In so doing, both the magistrate and the district co~iiterroneously believed that Two Jinn could
request extradition. However, pursuant to I.C. 3 19-4523(2):
When the retuin to this state is required of a person who has been convicted of a
criinc in this state and . . . broken the terms of his . . . probation . . ., the
prosecuting attorney of the county in which the offense was committed, the
director of the commission of pardons and parole, or the director of the
department of correction or his designee, or head of any institution or facility
operated by or under contract with the department of correction, or sheriff of the
county from which escape was made, shall present to the governor a written
application for a requisition for the return of such person, in which application
shall be stated the name of the person, the crime of which he was convicted, the
circumstances of his escape from confinement or of the breach of the terms of his
bail, probation or parole, and the state in which he is believed to be, including the
location of the person therein at the time application is made.
I.C. 3 19-4523; see also 1984 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 35, ldaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-4, 1984 WL
162403, pg. 6 (ldaho A.G.) ("the decision to apply to the governor for a wah.ant of extradition is

committed to the discretion of the county prosecuting attorney"). Two Jinn could only notify the
state of Mr. Harris's location, which it did via its motion to exonerate. It could not, itself, apply
to the goveinor to I-equest that Oregon return Mr. Harris for prosecutton. That the state failed to
exhibit any actual interest in regaining custody of Mr. Harris through prompt efforts to extradite
him weighs in favor of setting aside the forfeiture. Further, to refuse to exonerate the bond in
these circumstances rewards the state's lack of interest in extraditing Mr. Harris with a windfall
of the forfeiture funds in its treasury.
In finding that exoneration was not warranted because Two Jinn should have secured the
bond, the magistrate failed to vecognize how the purpose oT bail is effectuated through rules
providing for relief from forfeiture. Bail is not to punish the surety or to provide the state with a
windfall but to effectuate the accused's appearance in court. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144
Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. Where the defendant fails to appear, as happened in this case, the
puil~oseof bail is served by providing the surety a financial incentive to locate the defendant and

ty
Agency v. State, 724 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. App.
return him to the coust. See C o ~ ~ nBonding
1998) ("The purpose of [a Florida statute permitting exoneration when the surety has
substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant] is to
create a financial incentive for sureties to locate and apprehend fugitives"); Barber Bonding

Agency, 860 So.2d at 12 (Liberal intelpretation of forfeiture statutes in favor of sureties provides
incentives to sureties "to pursue those who flee the jurisdiction").
Two Jinn could have simply attempted to collect the amount of forfeiture from the cosigner on Mr. Hal-ris's bond. However, encouraging bail bond companies to proceed in that
manner by refusing to exonerate the bond in circumstances such as these is contrary to public

polrcy and the ball bond's purpose of effectuating the defendant's appearance rn court Rather,
the purpose of bail is served by rewarding the bail bond companies' efforts to return the
defendant to court instead of encouragrng them to s~mplycollect money from a co-signor.
Similarly, the magistrate and district court's conclusion that the forfeiture should stand
i s to appear and the purpose of bail had thus not been met also failed to
because Mr. H a ~ ~failed
recognize the purpose underlying forfeiture. As explained by the California appellate court:
Given the limited resources of law enforcement agencies, it is bail bond
companies, as a practical matter, who are most involved in looking for fugitives
from justice . . . if the bonding company has no assurance that once it has located
the absconding defendant its bail will be exonerated even if the prosecutor elects
not to extradite the defendant the company has no financial incentive to undertake
the search.
County ofLos Angeles v. Anzerican Co~zlrciclorsIrzdenz. Co., 152 Cal.App.4th 661, 666 (Cal.

App. 2007). Thus, disfavoring forfeiture "is not so much for the bail bond companies" but also
serves the public interest in "the retuln of fleeing defendants to face tvial and punishment if found
guilty." Anzericnn Contractors lizdenz. Co., 152 Cal.App.4th at 666. These concerns even
prompted California and Florida to enact laws providing for exoneration under circumstances
similar to this case. See Cal. Penal Code

5

1305(g) (providing foi exoneration where a bail agent

locates a fleeing defendant in another jurisdiction and secures his positive identification but the
state refuses to extradite after being notified of the defendant's location); County Boizdilzg
Agency, 724 So.2d at 133 (discussing Florida statute that permits exoneration when the surety

has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant)
It serves the public interest and the primary purpose of bail to provide the surety with an
incentive to find defendants who have failed to appear. Two Jinn underwent considerable effort

to locate Mr. Harris, including obtaining his fingerprints, his photograph and a photograph of his
identification. Two Jinn attempted to persuade Mr. Harris to return and offered to give him a
ride. Two Jinn then filed a motion to exonerate, which informed the state of Mr. Harris's
location. If such circumstances are considered insufficient to demonstrate that justice does not
require enforcement of the forfeiture, hail agents such as Two Jinn will no longer undertake the
expense to find defendants who have fled Idaho -particularly those who have fled to neighboring
Oregon where it is unlawful for Two Jinn to apprehend and return the defendant to Idaho to face
prosecution. See State v. Epps, 585 P.2d 425,428-29 (Or. App. 1978) (holding that common-law
doctrine giving bail agent absolute dominion over his principal is not recognized in Oregon and
upholding hail agents' kidnaping convictions for arresting absconding defendant and transporting
him to California).
The magistrate erroneously considered whether it was unjust to uphold the forfeitul-e
rather than whether justice required the forfeiture's enforcement. The magistrate also incorrectly
weighed the state's failure to seek Mr. Harris's extradition against Two Jinn instead of applying
that factor in its favor. Further, the magistrate failed to 1-ecognizethe policies underlying relief
from forfeiture, including fulfilling hail's purpose by providing the surety a financial incentive to
locate absconding defendants. The magistrate thus abused its discretion in failing to reach its
conclusion consistently with applicable legal standards or through an exercise of reason.
Moreover, Two Jinn went to extensive effotts to locate the defendant and attempted to
convince him to return to Idaho. The state failed to take advantage of Two Jinn's investigatory
efforts and exhibit an interest in prosecuting Mr. Hal~isby seeking to extradite him. The
wilfulness of Mr. Hamis's failure to appear is somewhat mitigated by his efforts to contact his

attorney to obtain a continuance so that he could obtain time off from work. Accordingly, proper
application of the relevant factors establishes that justice did not require the forfeiture's
enforcement and the distllct court erred in affirming the magistrate decision to deny Two Jinn's
motion to exonerate.

C.

The Magistrate Erred In Concluding that the Doctrine of Impossibility Did Not
Require Exoneration of the Bond.
The magistrate indicated: "I do not find that the mere fact that the defendant is unwilling

to return to Oregon [sic] and the inere possible threat of being charged with a crime in Oregon
creates a legal impossibility such that it would be - not be just to let the forfeiture stand." Tr.
(10-31-2008), pg. 8, ln.10-19. However, because Oregon law and the state's lack of interest in
prosecuting Mr. Harris made it impossible for Two Jinn to bring him before the couit, the
doctrine of impossibility should excuse Two Jinn's performailce under the bail bond agreement.
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an
accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the apperu-anceof
an accused. State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 993, 995, 188 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116,952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 19981. The extent
of the surety's undertaking is determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules of
contract law and suretyship. Castro, 145 Idaho at 995, 188 P.3d at 937; Abracadabra Bail
Bon.ds, 131 Idaho at 116,952 P.2d at 1252. Because it is a contract, existing law becomes part of
the bail bond agreement, as though the contract contains an express provision to that effect
Abracadabra Bail Boizds, 131 Idaho at 116, 952 P.2d at 1252. The primary aim in interpreting
contracts is to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time their contract is made. Castro,

145 Idaho at 995, 188 P.3d at 937
Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) directs the court to exonerate the bond if the defendant is
brought before the court within 180 days following forfeiture. Here, Two Jinn located Mr. Harris
in The Dalles, Oregon within 180 days following the forfeiture, took his fingerprints and
photograph, photographed his identification, offered transportation back to Idaho and attempted
to persuade him to voluntarily surrender. R. 122-132. Two Jinn could not arrest Mr. Harris
because Oregon law does not permit bail agents such as Two Jinn to surrender absconding
defendants and instead requires use of the extradition process. See Epps, 585 P.2d at 429. The
state had not requested an extraditable warrant that would have permitted Oregon law
enforcement to arl-est Mr. Harris at Two Jinn's request.
'The doctrine of impossibility excuses contractual performance when: (1) a contingency
occurs; (2) performance is impossible, not just more difficult or more expensive; and (3) the
nonoccurrence of tile contingency was a basic assumption of the agreement. Kessler v. Tortoise
Developmeizl, Iizc., 130 Idaho 105, 108, 937 P.2d 417,420 (1997). Sine qua lzolz for application
of the doctrine is that the parties must have contracted, expressly or in necessary contemplation,
with reference to continued existence of the specific thing as a condition essential to
performance. Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of ldalzo, 121 Idaho 463,465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121
(1992). The task itself must be impossible -the doctrine does not apply if a different promisor
could perform. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 198 P.3d 749,752 (Ct. App. 2008).
The purpose of the bail bond agreement is to effectuate the defendant's presence in court
to answer to the charges brought by the State - it is not meant to collect revenue or to punish
sureties. 8A Am. Jur. 2d 3 2; see also Quick Release Bail Boizds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at

792.' Thus, the basic assumption of the bail bond contract and an essential component of its
perfoimance is the state's continued desire to prosecute the defendant. Here, Two Jinn did what
it could under the contract by locating Mr. Harris but was unable to cause him to be brought
before the court because the state did not exhibit an interest in regaining his custody. Any bail
agent would be similarly unable to perform and, thus, the impossibility was not personal to Two
Jinn. CJI: Chacorz, 146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752 (refusing to apply impossibility doctrine to
defendant's rnabilsty to make drug purchases as a result of target's mistrust of defendant because
the claiined impossibility was personal to the defendant and he did not argue that it was
impossible for anyone to purchase drugs from the target or other dealers).
The bail bond's purpose is to effectuate the accused's presence in couit and, thus, it was a
basic assumption of that contract that the state would continue to desire to prosecute Mr. Harris
Because the state did notexhibit an interest in regaining custody of Mr. I-Iarris and Oregon law
does not permit Two Jinn to asrest him, it was impossible for Two Jinn to bring Mr. Harris
before the court following his failure to appear. Accordingly, the doctrine of impossibility
should excuse Two Jinn's performance and this Court should reverse the district court's decision
affirming the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's motion to exonerate the bond.

V. CONCLUSION
Two Jinn respectfully asks that t h ~ sCourt vacate the dlstrict court's order affirming the
magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate and direct that an order setting aside the
forfeiture and exonerating the bond be entered

Respectfully submitted this

day of October, 2009.
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